Homeland Security in Real-Time The Power of the Public and Mobile Technology by Heighington, Andrew
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2011-06-00
Homeland Security in Real-Time The
Power of the Public and Mobile Technology
Heighington, Andrew
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Homeland Security Affairs (June 2011), v.7 no. 13
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/24973




In the world of homeland security,  mobile 
phones are too often viewed as  detonation 
devices  rather than vital communication 
mechanisms to prevent terrorist attacks 
from occurring. I t takes col lect ive 
intelligence from  federal, state,  and local 
entities,  as well as  the public,  to  prevent 
terrorist attacks.  Mobile technology 
empowers  collective intelligence in ways 
that were never before possible.  This  essay 
a r g u e s  t h a t t h e n a t i o n ’ s  c r i s i s 
communication strategy must be broader 
and more innovative  than commercial 
broadcast alerts,  mobile text messages, and 
social media sites such as  Facebook and 
Twitter.   Federal,  state,  and local officials,  in 
concert with  the  public,  should adopt a 
strategy that leverages  mobile technology 
and harnesses  the power of mobile 
applications that allow  communication 
between the government and individuals.
INTRODUCTION
Crises are unpredictable events that  demand 
adaptation  and flexibility. During  a crisis, 
many  communication  experts contend that 
the public engages in information-seeking 
behaviors to reduce uncertainty. 1  Research 
indicates that  effective crisis communication 
with  the public requires a  clear, relevant,  and 
timely  narrative,  openness to dialogic 
communication, and source credibility.2 
However,  as Sung  Yung Yang  and others 
note,  the content  of the message is only  half 
t h e c h a l l e n g e : “ D i f f e r e n t  f o r m s o f 
communication  can  bring  out  a  completely 
different individual  interpretation  – and in 
turn , var ious post -cr i s i s react ions , 
including… attitudinal  and behavioral 
outcomes.” 3 Traditional  media  used for  crisis 
communication  typically  includes television 
and radio broadcasts,  print,  and the Internet. 
Social media  is quickly  emerging  as another 
form  of communication  that  shapes attitudes 
and behaviors by  allowing the public to better 
seek and share crisis information.
During the 2008  Mumbai terrorist 
attacks, for  example,  vital information, such 
as emergency  phone numbers and hospitals 
needing blood donations, was distributed via 
Twitter. 4  Closer  to home,  Twitter  provided 
valuable situational awareness to the public 
and military  families in  the aftermath  of the 
Ft. Hood shooting  in  2009. 5 Research  on  the 
September 11th attacks also reveals that 
individuals actively  sought to reduce 
uncertainty  by  accessing information  through 
a  variety  of means. 6  The American  public, 
increasingly  accustomed to the distribution 
and receipt  of information  in real-time, will 
likely  engage in  similar  information  seeking 
behaviors that  leverage technology  during the 
next crisis.  Consequently,  the United States 
government  is taking  important steps to 
prepare for  this likelihood.  Craig  Fugate, 
administrator  of the Federal  Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), stated: 
As social media  becomes more a  part of 
our daily  lives, people are turning to it 
during emergencies as  well. We need to 
utilize these tools, to the best of our 
abilities, to engage and inform the public, 
because no matter how much federal, 
state and local  officials do, we will only be 
successful  if the public is brought in as 
part of the team.7  
But  are current crisis communication  tools 
such  as television and radio broadcasts, print, 
the Internet,  and social media  effective at 
leveraging  the public during a  crisis? Is a 
more robust platform  needed to prevent 
terrorist attacks from occurring? 8
This essay  argues that television and radio 
broadcasts, print,  the Internet, and social 
media  are not  optimally  suited to mobilizing 
the public to prevent  a  terrorist attack from 
occurring.  The United States government,  in 
partnership with  the public,  and state and 
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local  entities,  should explore ways to better 
leverage the convergence of the Internet and 
mobile devices via  smart  phones to engage 
the public.  Today,  more Americans have 
cellular  mobile phone subscriptions than 
Internet subscriptions and smart  phones are 
quickly  becoming the standard cellular 
phone.9  As of December  2010,  63.2  million 
people in the United States owned smart 
phones, which  is a  60 percent  increase since 
2009. 10 The increasingly  mobile nature of the 
public through  sophisticated smart  phones 
presents a  significant opportunity  to improve 
the role of the public  in  preventing  terrorist 
attacks in the United States.
CURRENT CRISIS COMMUNICATION TOOLS
The U.S. government  is reinvigorating  the 
notion that the public can serve as a  useful 
ally  during a crisis.  In  the 2010  National 
Security Strategy ,  President  Obama 
appropriately  recognized that  “the ideas, 
values,  energy, creativity,  and resilience of 
our  c i t izens are  America ’s greatest 
resource.” 11  In  pursuit  of this goal,  the 
secretary  of homeland security  launched New 
York ’s Metropol i tan  Transportat ion 
Authority’s “see something,  say  something” 
campaign  on  a  national scale to encourage 
citizens to remain  vigilant and report 
suspicious activity. Similar  public  awareness 
campaigns occurred during World War II and 
the Cold War, but this slogan, written one day 
after  9/11,  is used in  a  more diverse and 
ambiguous threat  environment.  In  order  for 
the campaign  to be effective, it  must issue a 
clear  message on  what is suspicious. 
Although  the “see something, say  something” 
campaign  comes from  a  credible source and 
is an  important  start  to opening dialogic 
communication  with  the public,  the narrative 
provides scant  details of what  the American 
public should look for  that  might  increase, 
rather than decrease, uncertainty.  
Internet-based social networking tools are 
also playing an  increasingly  important role as 
the U.S. government  looks to forge stronger 
bonds with  the public.  As of July  2010, 
twenty-two of twenty-four  major  federal 
agencies have official  Facebook,  Twitter, and 
YouTube accounts. 12 Many  of these agencies, 
including FEMA, also maintain  blogs and 
mobile websites. 13  These internet-based 
social  networking  tools, however,  require 
users to pull information from  the sites. They 
have limited capability  to leverage the public 
as force multipliers by  distributing  actionable 
information in real-time.
On the mobile front, FEMA  is leading  the 
development of an  important  outreach  tool  to 
improve public  safety  that  will employ  new 
and existing  communication  platforms to 
rapidly  disseminate emergency  messages to 
as many  people as possible. This outreach 
tool  – the Integrated Public  Alert and 
Warning  System  (IPAWS) – will  transform 
the traditional  audio-only  warnings sent  via 
radio and television.  Once implemented,  the 
U.S. government  will have the means to send 
emergency  text  alerts to cell-phone users 
within county-sized geographic areas.  
Text  alerts using  IPAWS have a maximum 
displayable  message size of ninety  characters, 
which  severely  limits the narrative  the 
government  can  provide to the public. 14 
Valuable information  can  be relayed to the 
public  in  ninety  characters, but these 
parameters will make it difficult  to 
disseminate enough  actionable information 
to mobilize the public  to prevent an 
imminent attack from  occurring. At  this time, 
there is no clear plan  to leverage IPAWS to 
create a  bidirectional architecture to 
communicate with the public during a crisis.
Current and future crisis communication 
mechanisms such  as “see something,  say 
something,”  social media  sites like Twitter 
and Facebook,  and IPAWS are not the best 
tools for  harnessing public  capital  in  a  crisis. 
None of these communication  platforms 
provide a  capability  that can  fully  meet  the 
t h r e e c r i t e r i o n  o f e f f e c t i v e c r i s i s 
communication: a  clear, relevant,  and timely 
n a r r a t i v e ; o p e n n e s s t o d i a l o g i c 
communication; and source credibility. 
Moreover, even  though cellular  infrastructure 
cannot be relied upon  post-incident,  existing 
m o b i l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t o o l s a r e 
overwhelmingly  tailored towards response. 
Crisis communication  in  the face of an 
imminent terrorist  attack requires a  more 
robust  communication  platform; the 
operating  environment  for  prevention is far 
more ambiguous than that  for  response. 
Whereas response operations manage the 
consequences of an  incident that  has already 
occurred,  prevention  operations attempt  to 
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thwart an incident  before  it  occurs despite 
many  unknowns. It will  take collective 
intelligence from  federal,  state,  and local 
entities,  as well  as the  public,  to reveal usable 
information  about  the potential  perpetrator, 
the targeted region,  and/or  the approach 
vector.
THE WAY FORWARD:
TAPPING INTO THE MOBILE REVOLUTION 
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t , i n 
partnership with  state and local entities, 
should explore the feasibility  of developing a 
mobile application  that  can  more effectively 
help the public prevent terrorist attacks. The 
mobile application  should include the 
capability  to disseminate images and 
descriptive information  of the threat  to a 
geographically  targeted audience; enable 
individuals to report  suspicious activity  by 
pressing a  button  to automatically  call or  text 
authorities; and notify  mobile application 
users through  an active,  audible, unique ring 
tone. 
There are several benefits to developing  a 
United States government sponsored mobile 
application  with  these capabilities. First,  a 
mobile application  meets key  elements for 
effective crisis communication: a  clear  and 
relevant  narrative,  openness to dialogic 
communication, and source credibility. With 
potentially  millions of eyes on  the ground 
that  know  who or  what  to look for, the public 
would become a valuable bottom-up resource 
that  significantly  increases our  ability  to 
prevent an  imminent  terrorist  attack from 
occurring  and/or  to capture a  perpetrator. 
Popular  social  media  outlets like Facebook 
and Twitter  rely  on  the user  to pull 
information from  the site. There is no 
automatic  pushing of information  to the user. 
A  crisis communication mobile application 
fills that  void by  allowing  officials to rapidly 
push generalized or  localized information  to 
the user  and pull information  back from  the 
public. This capability  would enable a  large 
segment of the American public to play  a 
productive role in  preventing  a  crisis from 
occurring or spreading.
S e c o n d , m o b i l e a p p l i c a t i o n s a r e 
inexpensive and easy  to develop.  The AMBER 
Alert iPhone application  went from  an  idea  to 
a  finished, fully  functional  product in  one 
day. This application includes all current, 
active AMBER alerts with  a  small photo of 
the victim.  Each  alert  contains detailed 
information  about the abduction,  including 
p h y s i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n ,  l a s t  k n o w n 
whereabouts, and any  details or  photos of 
suspects.  A  "Report Sighting" button  allows 
an  individual to report a  sighting  of a  victim 
or  suspects along with  the current GPS 
coordinates to the investigative agency.  These 
reported sightings can then  be geographically 
aggregated so investigators can  better  assess 
the credibility of multiple reports. 15 
Lastly, the plethora  of information  sources 
– including media outlets,  blogs, and twitter 
feeds – creates a  “fog  of war”  that hinders 
credible and transparent engagement with 
the public. A  government sponsored mobile 
application  provides a  mechanism  to manage 
the message by  distributing  credible and clear 
information  to users. The public would have a 
precise understanding  of who or  what  to look 
for  and how  to report a sighting. Public 
s ight ings made through  the mobi le 
application  then  could be visualized on  a map 
or  timeline by  using free and open  source 
technology  such  as the Ushahidi Platform. 
This platform  aided the Haiti Earthquake 
response and the 2010 Washington,  D.C. 
“snowmaggedon” clean  up. During a  terrorist 
incident,  officials could plot  public  reports on 
a  map, identify  geographic clusters to quickly 
corroborate reports, and dispatch  resources 
accordingly. This inexpensive,  prevalent, and 
intuitive technology  creates a  dynamic, 
multidimensional platform  that  would enable 
the U.S.  government to do more than  simply 
communicate with  the public  during  a  crisis. 
It also provides a  valuable mechanism  for  the 
public to communicate with the government 
during  a  crisis and for  the government  to 
filter,  validate,  and manage a  high  volume of 
reports.
A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE:CRISIS 
COMMUNICATION DURING A BIOLOGICAL 
ATTACK 
Imagining  a  scenario provides a  practical way 
to understand the uti l i ty  of mobile 
applications in  preventing  a  terrorist attack. 
This hypothetical biological terrorist  attack 
provides a strong starting point. 
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The BioWatch Program  in New 
York  City, using a series of pathogen 
detectors, provides  initial indications 
of a widespread aerosol release. 
State, local, and federal officials 
scramble to confirm the positive 
finding and identify the pathogen. If 
it is  a  biological attack,  prophylaxis 
must be  delivered to all individuals  in 
the affected area within forty-eight 
hours or the consequences will be 
dire.  As a result, state,  local, and 
federal officials  preposition assets 
and prepare for the distribution of 
medicine from the  Strategic National 
Stockpile managed by  the Centers  for 
Disease Control.  
A few  hours  later,  the  Laboratory 
Response Network  for Bioterrorism 
confirms that the pathogen is 
anthrax. The FBI immediately 
i n i t i a t e s a m a n h u n t f o r t h e 
perpetrators of this  attack  (and likely 
other near simultaneous  or follow-on 
attacks).  In support of the FBI,  the 
intelligence community reprioritizes 
intelligence assets to assist with the 
identification of perpetrators.  These 
agencies  identify a suspect and find 
indicators that a follow-on biological 
attack is imminent; however,  they 
cannot pinpoint the expected target 
or locate  the suspect.  The president 
uses the Emergency Alert System to 
disseminate the threat through 
traditional means such as  television 
and radio. Local officials  with  text 
messaging emergency  notification 
capabilities  also  deploy messages  to 
the public. 
Twelve hours  into  the incident, 
communication via the Emergency 
Alert System and local means have 
yielded few  results.  Misguided calls 
inundate local law  enforcement 
a g e n c i e s , w a s t i n g t i m e a n d 
resources. The federal government 
decides to use a mobile application to 
disseminate information,  including a 
photo, of the suspect.  Those with the 
mobile application on their phone 
now  know  exactly who to  look  for 
and, recognizing the seriousness  of 
the situation,  forward the picture to 
their families and friends. Local law 
enforcement receives a plethora of 
tips, but the mobile application, by 
geographically aggregating all 
reports, allows investigators  to 
assess  the  credibility of multiple 
reports and efficiently deploy assets. 
Eight different people report 
seeing the individual in a white van 
at a Washington, DC gas  station. 
L a w  e n f o r c e m e n t s c r a m b l e s 
resources to the scene and uses  the 
gas  station’s security cameras to 
obtain the license  plate of the  van. 
Federal officials,  working closely 
with state and local officials,  then 
disseminate a second,  targeted 
message to those in the metro  DC 
area with the mobile  application. The 
message includes  the license plate 
number in addition to  the photo of 
the individual. A tourist outside the 
U.S.  Capitol sees  the van parked 
across  the street and immediately 
reports  the sighting through her 
mobile phone.  Shortly thereafter,  law 
e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c i a l s  r e c e i v e 
additional tips  via the mobile 
application.  All of these reports  are 
automatically plotted in Google Maps 
and law  enforcement officials  quickly 
recognize that the follow-on tips 
provide strong evidence that the 
initial report was  credible.  All 
r e s o u r c e s a r e i m m e d i a t e l y 
dispatched to the incident scene. The 
perpetrator is  apprehended and the 
second attack is prevented.  
It may  be just  a  matter  of time until  a 
scenario such  as this occurs.  The proposed 
mobile application  will not necessarily 
prevent  all  terrorist  attacks. It  could, 
however, give the nation  its best  chance to 
prevent an  imminent  terrorist  attack from 
occurring  by  rapidly  marshaling  the public in 
a cost-effective and timely manner.
THE PRIVACY CHALLENGE 
Pursuing this initiative will  entail overcoming 
a  significant, but  not  insurmountable, privacy 
issue. Individuals will likely  express concerns 
about  having  a  government  sponsored 
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application  on  their  mobile device.  In  order 
to address these challenges, the federal 
government  should construct the mobile 
application  program  along  the following 
guidelines.  First, it  must be a  free service for 
all  users. Second, individuals who do not 
want to participate may  opt  out  at  any  time. 
Third, the mobile application  must adhere to 
the most  stringent privacy  controls available 
and will  not collect  personal data. Fourth,  the 
government  must  only  transmit  messages via 
the mobile application during  an emergency. 
The mobile application  should not  bombard 
individuals with  daily  or  even  monthly 
messages from  the government. Lastly,  an 
outreach campaign  should include a frank 
discussion  with  the American  public 
regarding  the vital role  of individuals in 
preventing  terrorist  attacks and the benefits 
of participating  in  the mobile application 
program. 
CONCLUSION
In  the world of homeland security,  mobile 
phones are too often  viewed as detonation 
devices rather  than  crucial communication 
mechanisms.  In  order  to significantly  tilt  the 
odds against  the terrorists and in  favor of the 
“ g o o d g u y s , ”  t h e n a t i o n ’ s c r i s i s 
communication  strategy  must  be broader  and 
more innovative than  commercial  broadcast 
alerts,  mobile text  messages,  and social 
media  sites such as Facebook and Twitter. 
Federal,  state,  and local officials,  in  concert 
with  the public,  should adopt  a  strategy  that 
leverages mobile technology  and harnesses 
the power of mobile applications.  There is no 
silver  bullet  solution  to preventing terrorist 
attacks, but mobile applications provide a 
more robust mechanism  to tap into millions 
of eyes on  the ground during  a  crisis and the 
tool  the public needs to “see something, say 
something.”  It  is a new  form  of the old 
neighborhood watch  concept,  providing 
expanded situational awareness to the public 
during  a crisis and better  intelligence leads to 
prevent and apprehend the “bad guys.” 
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